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Introduction
Discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
age, or disability is prohibited under federal law and the provisions of many 
state laws, most of which are applicable to both public and private institutions 
of higher education. Courts have also ruled that discrimination of transgender 
individuals qualifies as sex discrimination under Title VII.1 Principal among 
the federal statutes that cover employment discrimination are Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,3 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,4 the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act,5 the Equal Pay Act,6 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,7 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,8 and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.9 While sexual harassment and claims under 
Section 504 and the ADA are addressed elsewhere in this text, employment 
discrimination continues to be guided by the burden of proof developed in 
litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This chapter addresses the 
burden of proof applicable to cases of employment discrimination, as developed 
in litigation involving Title VII and applicable to other federal laws prohibiting 
discrimination in employment. 
1 See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d. 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
3 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
4 29 U.S.C. § 794.
5 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
6 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (2004).
7 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits 
age-based discrimination in employment for persons 40 years of age or older.  The law prohibits 
age discrimination in hiring, discharge, pay, promotions and other terms and conditions of 
employment. As part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, its application is to institutions with 
twenty or more employees and which affect interstate commerce. The standards for coverage 
parallel those of Title VII.
8 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.  Along with Title VII, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
prohibits discrimination against aliens. 
9 42 U.S.C. Section 2000ff et seq.
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While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly address employment dis-
crimination, the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments limit the power of federal 
and state governments to discriminate. While the Fifth Amendment explicitly 
requires that the federal government not deprive individuals of “life, liberty, and 
property”10 without due process of law, section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment11 grants Congress the authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause 
and enact federal antidiscrimination law. The theme of federal employment 
discrimination law is that similarly situated employees or prospective employ-
ees should receive equal treatment by employers. These laws are intended to 
ensure equality in the employment relationship for groups or individuals who 
are different in some respect, such as race or sex. 
Because these laws have broad application to institutions of higher educa-
tion (exceptions for private religious institutions are discussed in earlier chap-
ters) and considering that many of these laws are mirrored in corresponding 
state statutes, this chapter will focus on the principal federal statute forbidding 
employment discrimination in colleges and universities, Title VII.
Job Fit and Employment Discrimination  
in Higher Education12
In the higher education setting, many professionals, both faculty and 
student affairs professionals alike, may be challenged by their “fit” during 
the interview, hiring, and job performance stages. The understanding of “fit” 
is a result of a persistent invisibility of intersectionality that includes gender, 
race, and sexual orientation due to society and the courts using lenses that 
are colorblind and gender- and hetero-normative.13 The dominant culture’s 
expectations of appearance and behavior of applicants can outweigh as well 
as conflict with institutions’ promotion of diversity and inclusion. 
These expectations can be seen widely in the various cases that arise in 
courts. One example of this intersection follows when a public state college 
president commented on how well a new administrator was performing in their 
role, but expressed concern that they were not “fitting in” within their depart-
ment.14 The president did not give substantive feedback with their comment, 
leaving the administrator to ponder what it meant to not “fit in.” 
How do faculty and higher education and student affairs practitioners 
determine if they will “fit in” with a department and campus culture, especially 
10 United StateS ConSt., Fifth Amendment. 
11 United StateS ConSt., Fourteenth Amendment, section five.
12 See generally David Hòa Khoa Nguyễn and LaWanda W.M. Ward, Innocent Until Proven 
Guilty: A Critical Interrogation of the Legal Aspects of Job Fit in Higher Education (pp. 27 – 
48), In Brian J, Reece, Vu T. Tran, Elliott N. DeVore, and Gabby Porcaro (Eds.), debUnking 
the Myth of Job fit in higher edUCation and StUdent affairS (2019). 
13 See generally Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SignS: J. of WoMen in 
CUltUre and SoCiety 811 (2013).
14 See generally William G. Tierney, Organizational Culture in Higher Education: Defining the 
Essentials, 59 J. higher edUC. 2 (1988). 
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if their skills, knowledge, and disposition match a job description? Applicants 
may possess the educational background, relevant experiences, and proven 
skills for a position, but their personality or “fit” is not always easily determined 
from their resumes or curriculum vitae. Title VII, applied rigidly to a perceived 
wrongful employment action such as hiring, firing, or demotion, makes it 
difficult to prove “fit” is a cloaked method for discrimination because courts 
are reluctant to allow the effects of historic and current systemic exclusionary 
behavior toward marginalized populations to serve as evidence. 
 Fit has been a central focus in organizational theory since the 1960s, 
and it is relevant because prior studies have revealed that “individuals were 
most successful and satisfied when their skills, aptitude, values, and beliefs 
matched the organizations.”15 Evaluating in what ways “fit” becomes a proxy 
for discrimination in higher education and student affairs is necessary to en-
sure inclusive-centered approaches are utilized and not ones that “collude to 
maintain disparities and reinforce social inequity.”16 
As a result, Kezar identified two key criticisms regarding the concept of 
organizational fit. First, historically marginalized people are challenged with 
how to best present themselves among dominant environments to be viewed as 
the right fit for positions.17 Second, the likelihood of assimilation to dominant 
cultures increases because of the expectation to meet unspoken norms that may 
not align with one’s own unique expression and values.18 This assessment of 
“fit” is needed because it may be difficult for marginalized people in society 
to present themselves in an authentic way that will be considered the right 
“fit” for an organization. 
Title VII Overview
Title VII is the most comprehensive of the federal antidiscrimination 
statutes and prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, and national origin.19 As the United States Supreme Court has pointed 
out, “(I)n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended 
to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employ-
ment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or 
national origin."20 The law prohibits discrimination in individual employment 
decisions, as well as employer policies or patterns of conduct that discriminate 
broadly against members of protected groups. 
15 Adriana Kezar, Investigating Organizational Fit in a Participatory Leadership Environment, 
23 J. higher edUC. Pol’y and ManageMent 85, 87 (2001). 
16 Renee Crystal Chambers, laW and SoCial JUStiCe in higher edUCation, 10 (2017).
17 See generally Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell l.rev. 1259 
(2000).
18 See generally Kezar, supra note 15. 
19 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-5 (2000)).
20 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
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Within the protected classifications of Title VII, it is unlawful to dis-
criminate against any employee or applicant for employment with regard 
to hiring, termination, promotion, compensation, job training, or any other 
term, condition, or privilege of employment. The law extends to employment 
decisions based on stereotypes and assumptions about abilities, traits, or the 
performance of individuals. Discrimination on the basis of an immutable 
characteristic associated with race—such as skin color, hair texture, or certain 
facial features—violates Title VII, even though not all members of the race 
share the same characteristic. 
Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination and neutral job poli-
cies that disproportionately exclude marginalized populations and that are 
not job-related.21 Equal employment opportunity cannot be denied because of 
marriage to or association with an individual of a different race; membership 
in or association with ethnic-based organizations or groups; or attendance or 
participation in school or places of worship generally associated with certain 
minority groups. The statute’s standard of nondiscrimination is found in Sec-
tion 703(a) and makes it unlawful for an employer to:
1. fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation 
terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such in-
dividual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
2. limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.22
Title VII has been amended to include pregnancy-based discrimination 
in its prohibition of gender-based employment discrimination. The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability 
to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to 
permit otherwise.”23 Similarly, the Family and Medical Leave Act24 outlines 
similar requirements for pregnancy leave and pregnancy-related conditions 
to ensure that women are not unfairly discriminated against for their leave. 
In 2009, the language of Title VII was expanded with a narrow focus to 
counteract damage created by a 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision25 in which 
21 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (examining intentional 
discrimination); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (examining unintentional 
discrimination). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003).
23 Id. at § 2000e(k).
24 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2006). 
25 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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the Court determined that the statute of limitations runs from the date of a pay 
decision setting a discriminatory wage, rather than from the date of any pay-
check affected by the prior discriminatory pay decision. That decision severely 
limited the ability of employees to successfully challenge discriminatory ac-
tions, given the extremely short timeline to not only learn of the discriminatory 
action, but also challenge it. While considering new legislation26 to offset the 
effect of that ruling, Congress found that the outcome of the case “signifi-
cantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation 
that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American 
law for decades.”27 In ultimately adopting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Congress added language to Title VII that provides:
[U]nlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimina-
tion in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an indi-
vidual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision 
or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of 
a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including 
each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting 
in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.28
Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of a condition that 
predominately affects a protected group, unless the practice is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity, termed a Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification or BFOQ. BFOQ’s may apply to situations involving religion 
or sex.29 The protected characteristics of race and national origin are excluded 
as a BFOQ for college and university positions.30 
Harassment is another form of employment discrimination that is in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It is defined as unwelcome conduct that 
is based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age, 
disability, or genetic information. Harassment is unlawful when 1) one endures 
offensive conduct as a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct 
is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable 
person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has recently made it more challenging for an employer to be liable for 
a hostile work environment by broadening employer latitude. In Vance v. Ball 
State University, the Supreme Court addressed who would be considered a 
supervisor for the purposes of Title VII hostile work environment harassment.31 
Since a supervisor can trigger hostile work environment liability more easily 
than a coworker, the interpretation of who is a “supervisor” is important.32 The 
26 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
27 Id at 5.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).
29 Id at § 2000e-2(e)(1).
30 William A. Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee, the laW of higher edUCation 200 (3d. ed. 1995).
31 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
32 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998). 
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Court defined “supervisor” narrowly, finding that for the purposes of hostile 
work environment harassment, a supervisor is an employee who can affect 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, promotion, 
reassignment, etc.33 Based on this limited definition, Ball State University was 
not found to be liable for a hostile work environment because the harasser was 
found to be a coworker and not a supervisor.34 
Title VII is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, which has issued a series of regulations and guidelines.35 As a regula-
tory enforcement body, it may receive, investigate, and resolve complaints 
of unlawful employment discrimination. In addition, it may initiate lawsuits 
against violators or issue right-to-sue letters to complainants.36 In order for 
an individual to succeed, Title VII gives employees two possible causes of 
action. Under a theory of disparate impact, plaintiffs allege that an employer's 
facially neutral policies have a discriminatory effect on a protected group, 
and the employer cannot justify the policies by business necessity. Under a 
theory of disparate treatment, plaintiffs allege that an employer intentionally 
discriminated against a member or members of a protected group and a shifting 
burden of proof applies to the determination of liability. Disparate treatment is 
more common in postsecondary education and can manifest when an individual 
is denied a job, promotion, tenure, or claims to be treated less favorably than 
his/her colleagues because of his/her race, sex, national origin, or religion and 
is subjected to a detrimental working condition.37 Below, we examine how 
these two claims apply. 
Disparate Impact
A plaintiff proves disparate impact by establishing that a particular em-
ployment practice has an adverse effect on employees of the plaintiff's race or 
sex, regardless of the employer’s intent. In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,38 
for example, the employer required workers seeking promotion to achieve a 
particular score on aptitude tests.39 The plaintiffs established that the test had 
an adverse effect on African American workers because they passed at a sig-
nificantly lower rate than did other workers. The test was not shown to bear 
a reasonable relationship to the requirements of the job, as a passing score on 
the test was not predictive of success on the job. In Griggs, the test led to the 
employer’s selection of a significantly greater proportion of white employees 
than of African Americans for promotional opportunities within the company. 
The test was said to have a disproportionately adverse effect on African Ameri-
33 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
34 Id. at 2453.
35 29 C.F.R. Parts 1600 – 1610. 
36 29 C.F.R. Part 1601.
37 See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 656 F.2d. 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff alleged 
sex discrimination after being denied of tenure). 
38 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
39  Id. at 427.
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cans and, by using the test as the basis for selection, the employer effectively 
discriminated against the plaintiffs because of their race. 
What distinguishes disparate impact claims based on the reasoning estab-
lished in Griggs is that the plaintiffs were successful without proving that the 
employer intended to discriminate on the basis of race. The test was neither 
job-related, nor did it select employees for promotion opportunities at random. 
If the test had selected at random, the success rates of African Americans and 
other employees would have been representative of the proportions of these 
employees taking the test. The test would have had no adverse effect and 
would have been legal. Since the test was shown to have a disparate impact 
on a minority, the employer’s use of the test to decide whom to promote meant 
the employer effectively made decisions based on race, whether it was the 
employer’s intention to do so or not.40 
The Griggs Court unanimously concluded that a facially neutral employ-
ment practice that has a disproportionately adverse effect on a minority cannot 
be used unless it is justified by a standard known as “business necessity.”41 
Section 703(k)(1)(A) of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, provides: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is es-
tablished under this subchapter only if (i) a complaining party dem-
onstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice 
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that 
the challenged practice is job related for the position and consistent 
with business necessity.42
Disparate impact analysis has not been extensively litigated in higher 
education, and courts have provided little guidance on the nature of a plaintiff’s 
proof and the requirements of an employer’s business necessity defense.43 
Several factors may account for the lack of reliance on disparate impact theo-
ries. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 mandated that no compensatory or puni-
tive damages are available under this theory, and this limitation on damages 
may discourage plaintiffs who seek more than equitable relief.44 In addition, 
disparate impact claims involve compliance with the rigorous requirements of 
40 This reasoning begs the question of whether claims of disparate impact are constitutional under 
the Section Five enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Violations of equal 
protection require deliberate intention to engage in invidious discrimination. Does a federal 
law aimed at prohibiting subconscious discrimination qualify as legislation enforcing equal 
protection? 
41 401 U.S. at 432.
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
43 For a discussion of the potential application of disparate impact in employment settings, see 
E.W. Shoben, “Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still 
Good For? What Not?,” 42 brandeiS l.J. 597 (Spring 2004).
44 See M. Rothstein et al., eMPloyMent laW, Vol. 1 § 2.31 (3rd ed. 2004).
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class-action lawsuits under federal law, which may tend to restrict the number 
of individual plaintiffs who seek relief under this theory. 
Perhaps most significant for higher education institutions, however, is the 
fact that selection devices such as aptitude tests and diploma requirements are 
seldom used as a basis for employment decisions. For example, faculty selec-
tion decisions are more often characterized by subjective, though job-related, 
criteria related to research, service, and teaching. Even for non-academic 
personnel, employment decisions are typically based on selection devices that 
have been validated as job-related and screened to reduce the possibility of 
invidious bias in test items. 
Disparate Treatment
With respect to disparate treatment, the principal United States Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting Title VII have involved how to prove discrimina-
tory intent. Under the standard most invoked in litigation, McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green,45 a test of circumstantial evidence has evolved. However, in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,46 a standard of “direct evidence” has received 
judicial recognition. With guidance from these two cases, lower federal courts 
have applied a standard in which a plaintiff may establish a claim of Title VII 
discrimination either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination or by 
proving circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of discrimi-
nation. A plaintiff need only prove direct evidence or circumstantial evidence 
because the two claims were mutually exclusive. Under the direct-evidence 
approach, once the plaintiff introduced evidence that the employer terminated 
him or her because of his or her race or other protected status, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have terminated the 
plaintiff even if it had not been motivated by discrimination.47 
Direct evidence is “evidence, which if believed, proves [the] existence 
of [the] fact in issue without inference or presumption.”48 When a plaintiff 
offers direct evidence and the trier of fact accepts that evidence, the plaintiff 
has proven discrimination.49 However, a proof based on direct evidence of 
discrimination is often difficult to establish in a higher education context be-
45 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
46 490 U.S. 228 (1989). What suffices as “direct evidence,” and whether “direct vs. circumstantial” 
evidence remains an important issue may have been undercut by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). See Clark v. Claremont University, 6 Cal. 
App. 4th 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) for an example of direct evidence of discrimination where 
an assistant professor who was denied tenure introduced evidence of numerous racial remarks 
that the court found to provide substantial evidence of race discrimination. 
47 See Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).
48 Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1987).
49 McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding Cnty Bd. of Educ., 791 F.2d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
Employment Discrimination and Title VII / 157
cause vague and subjective judgments related to employee qualifications and 
performance are prevalent, particularly when faculty issues are involved.50 
The influence of the McDonnell Douglas “circumstantial evidence” stan-
dard in application to federal antidiscrimination law has been pervasive. The 
first step of the standard requires a plaintiff to meet a modest proof in support 
of a prima facie case and seems to favor the plaintiff. After the employee 
establishes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Once the 
employer does so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was 
pretextual, a subterfuge masking intent to discriminate.51 Applications of the 
test in higher education settings abound.
Racial and National Origin Discrimination
Historically, racial discrimination has been a primary issue in Title VII 
cases. Under the shifting burden of proof, also known as the “tripartite test” 
first articulated in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff challenging an employer’s 
hiring practices must first carry an initial burden of proof. This may be done 
by showing that he belongs to a racial minority group; that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; that, despite 
his qualifications, he was rejected; and that after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons 
of the complainant’s qualification.52 
The plaintiff’s initial burden of proof in disparate treatment cases involv-
ing race or national origin is illustrated in a number of cases in which higher 
education institutions were defendants. In one case, an African American 
environmental research analyst was given a negative performance rating by 
a white supervisor. The analyst was subject to disciplinary measures that 
included restrictions on funding for professional conferences and the require-
ment to maintain daily written logs of his activity. His white male supervisor 
called him “space pilgrim,” “lazy,” and accused him of “shifting positions all 
the time.” Alleging that these comments were racial slurs, the analyst filed an 
internal grievance alleging discrimination by the supervisor. On the recom-
mendation of the university’s grievance committee, the analyst was reassigned 
to another supervisor, but negative evaluations of his performance continued. 
When he was terminated in what the institution described as a layoff occa-
sioned by a reduction-in-force, he filed a claim alleging disparate treatment. A 
federal appeals court affirmed a summary judgment motion for the university, 
concluding that the analyst failed to establish a prima facie claim of disparate 
50 See Ben-Kotel v. Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2003) in which a claim of direct 
evidence of discrimination under Title VII was dismissed on appeal because the plaintiff, a 
national origin minority, failed to argue this claim in the district court.
51 See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 (1977). The court noted, 
“proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from 
the mere fact of difference in treatment.”
52 411 U.S. at 802.
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treatment.53 The appeals court found that the analyst relied on his own percep-
tions and the findings of the institution’s grievance committee in building his 
case, but reasoned that his perceptions were not evidence and the grievance 
report failed to provide the required inference of bias behind the institution’s 
actions, stipulating only that personality conflicts appeared to motivate the 
supervisor’s actions. 
In another case, the Eighth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas test 
in granting summary judgment to a higher education institution. An African 
American chair and professor claimed direct evidence of racial discrimination, 
as well as disparate treatment, when his institution failed to promote him to a 
position as dean and hired a white applicant from outside the institution. The 
professor had not applied for the position at the time it was filled and claimed 
that the institution had not provided a definitive application process, yet had 
a history of appointing from within. The federal appeals court found that the 
circumstances provided no direct evidence of discrimination, but the court 
proceeded to evaluate the professor’s claim under the shifting burden of proof. 
Despite the fact that the institution had hired several senior administrators 
from within, the court adopted the view that many positions at universities 
are necessarily filled in different ways, depending on the nature of a position, 
its responsibilities, and other factors. The court concluded that a reasonable 
fact-finder could not infer intentional race discrimination from the decision to 
consider outside applicants when seeking a qualified individual for a position 
as dean, and given the professor’s failure to make timely application for the 
position, summary judgment was granted in favor of the university.54 
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case, the burden 
then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employment action.55 Although a higher education institution must 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, 
given the subjective and scholarly nature of judgments that typically apply to 
employment decisions in academe and the reluctance of courts to intervene 
in employment decisions that involve faculty qualifications, an institution 
generally meets this requirement. For example, in a case in which a former 
business professor, who is an African male of Ethiopian origin, contended his 
nonrenewal was a pretext for Title VII disparate treatment, the institution pre-
vailed by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for nonrenewal, 
namely, student evaluations of the professor’s instructional performance that 
were regarded as below college standards.56
53 Pilgrim v. Trs. of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 1997).
54 Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 294 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2002).
55 Texas Dep't of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
56 Girma v. Skidmore College, 180 F.Supp.2d 326 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). See Nguyen and Ward, supra 
note 12. (Case study examining this specific case utilizing a Critical Race Theory lens and its 
implications on “fit”).
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In Guseh v. North Carolina Central University,57 a tenured professor who 
is a Liberian native and naturalized American citizen alleged that administra-
tors at his university denied him a department chairmanship due to national 
origin. In each of the four times the department position became available, it 
was given to someone native to the United States and from outside the depart-
ment. Further, the plaintiff alleged that each individual selected for the posi-
tion was less qualified than he. The defendants acknowledged the plaintiff’s 
qualifications, but argued that the appointed candidates were selected because 
the consensual scholarly and subjective judgment of the defendants was that 
the selected individuals would make better administrators. In rebuttal, the 
plaintiff simply offered a reiteration that his academic credentials surpassed 
those of the other candidates. As a result, the University moved to have the 
claims dismissed.
In considering the case, the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of North Carolina assumed for argument’s sake that the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case. When the university then provided legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action, the burden shifted back 
to the plaintiff to show that those reasons were simply pretexts for discrimina-
tion. As the plaintiff’s rationale that he was better qualified did not meet that 
burden, and the courts generally tend to avoid becoming entangled in reason-
able employment decisions, particularly those in academe, the court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s claims. 
To compound the plaintiff’s difficulties, once the institution articulates 
its reason for the adverse employment decision, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to persuade the court that he or she has been the victim of intentional 
discrimination and that the institution’s proffered reason is a veil to disguise 
the intent to discriminate. For lower federal courts, it has frequently not been 
enough for the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason is pretextual; the plaintiff must also show that it is a pretext 
concealing a discriminatory motivation. This standard has led some federal 
courts to require a proof of discriminatory intent, while other courts have 
adopted the position that if the employer’s reason is unworthy of belief, it can 
be assumed to be a disguise of a discriminatory motivation. 
By way of illustration, a candidate for a position as director of a language 
program at a New York university challenged the decision of a selection 
committee that rejected his candidacy in favor of an external candidate. The 
candidate, who was on the institution’s faculty and had served in the role of 
interim director, met the burden to establish a prima facie case under Title VII 
and challenged the institution’s proffered reason for the hiring decision, which 
related to teaching effectiveness. The rejected candidate contended that the 
institution's claim that it simply appointed the best candidate was pretextual, 
in light of evidence that the process of recruitment and selection deviated from 
normal institutional procedures; the search committee was made up of individu-
57 423 F. Supp. 2d 550; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41126.
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als who could not speak Spanish, yet was charged to assess the candidates on 
the basis of their teaching competence in a model Spanish lesson; and that this 
atypical search committee was created because of the administration’s belief 
that the interim director would likely win the position if normal procedures 
were followed. Although a federal district court granted summary judgment 
to the institution, a federal appeals court reversed, noting that the plaintiff’s 
evidence permitted an inference of discrimination on the basis of national 
origin, and remanding for further findings. The court noted that the articulated 
reason for the employment decision was that an evaluation had been made that 
one candidate was better than another, yet the challenged decision was made 
only after the institution had deviated from its normal selection procedures, 
had appointed advisors who lacked proficiency in the skills they were asked to 
evaluate, and had informed another potential candidate that the interim direc-
tor’s candidacy would not be considered seriously. From this evidence, the 
appeals court concluded that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether 
the institution’s explanation was a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.58 
The fact-intensive inquiry involved in the tripartite test is illustrated in a 
case in which a black assistant professor from the West Indies, who was hired 
on a tenure track, was issued a one-year contract and ultimately released by the 
institution. The trial court held the assistant professor met his initial burden of 
proof and went on to consider whether the institution articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason and assess whether that reason was pretextual. 
The institution defended its decision by presenting evidence of substandard 
performance evaluations, negative student evaluations, and failure to produce 
scholarly work and obtain the doctoral degree, which was expressly determined 
to be a requirement for maintaining the assistant professor’s tenure-track 
position. The assistant professor presented evidence to rebut the institution’s 
articulated reasons for the adverse employment decision, including evidence 
that the college had retained a white professor who did not have his doctorate 
and that student evaluations of teaching were tainted by a conspiracy among 
white students. While the trial court ruled in favor of the black professor, the 
federal appeals court reversed this ruling on the basis that the court’s factual 
findings were clearly erroneous. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the comparison with the white professor was inappropriate because he 
had been hired at an earlier time when the requirement for an advanced degree 
was not required. It also concluded that the trial court erred in inferring that the 
student evaluations were tainted, finding, for example, that student expressions 
indicating the assistant professor was difficult to understand might reasonably 
be interpreted as expressing a concern about effective communication, rather 
than discriminatory animus based on race or national origin.59 
In Mezu v. Morgan State University,60 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit dismissed a professor’s untimely discrimination claim, finding 
58 Stern v. Trs of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York, 131 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 1997).
59 Jimenez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F. 3d 369 (4th Cir.1995).
60 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3301 (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 2010).
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that a pending internal appeal did not halt the statute of limitations from run-
ning. Mezu, an African American woman of Nigerian origin, began teaching 
as a non-tenure-track lecturer and five years later earned a position as an as-
sociate professor. Four years later, in 2002, she applied for a promotion to full 
professor. Upon denial of the promotion, Mezu filed a complaint with the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and suit in federal court, 
alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. The district court 
dismissed the claim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision. 
In 2004, she applied a second time for full professor and was denied. In 
2005, she applied a third time for full professor and, although the departmental 
promotion committee recommended promoting her to full professor, the chair 
recommended against promotion and advised that additional scholarly publica-
tion should be pursued. On April 6, 2006, she was informed of the fact that she 
was denied promotion and of her right to appeal the decision, which she did 
within a few days. The university did not act and, in the belief that it would not 
comply with the appeal procedures, she filed a second EEOC claim on March 
25, 2007, followed by a suit in federal court. The district court dismissed the 
claim as untimely, as did the Fourth Circuit on appeal, which found that the 
letter of April 6, 2006, triggered the limitations period, despite the pending 
internal appeal. As such, the Mezu decision makes clear the imperative nature 
of awareness of the actual calendar of the limitations period. 
Religious Discrimination
Private religious schools are often exempt from some of the religious 
restrictions imposed by Title VII.61 It is also important to note that Title VII 
prohibitions on disparate treatment also extend to religious discrimination,62 
although religious institutions that are owned, supported, controlled, or man-
aged by a religious organization, or that have a curriculum that is generally 
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion, are permitted to ex-
ercise religious preferences. Issues of religious discrimination have prompted 
several cases at religious institutions. A Catholic faculty member was fired 
from a Presbyterian college for conducting surveys of other faculty members. 
After the survey incident, he allegedly did not receive raises, or received less 
than the average faculty member, for seven years. He sued, and the court 
dismissed his suit. The court held that if the college discharged him because 
of his religious views, it could lawfully do so under Title VII.63 In a similar 
situation, a private university that established a divinity school hired a profes-
sor to teach in both the divinity school and in the departments of religion and 
English. Differing theological views came between the professor and the dean 
of the divinity school, causing the professor to be released from his position 
61 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (recognizing 
a ministerial exception to Title VII).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
63 Wirth v. College of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (W. D. Mo. 1998).
162 / Chapter 7
there. The professor filed suit under Title VII.64 As the university received a 
portion of its annual budget from the Alabama Baptist Convention, the court 
held that the university qualified as an educational institution protected by the 
exemptions of Title VII.65 
The issue of preferential hiring by religious or religiously affiliated institu-
tions has been the subject of several lawsuits. For example, when preferential 
treatment was used for hiring by a religious university, the university was 
challenged by a Jewish faculty member. In this instance, a Jewish part-time 
lecturer in the university’s philosophy department objected when the university 
began requiring that seven of the department’s thirty-one, tenure-track faculty 
positions be held by Jesuit priests, arguing that their presence enhanced the 
character of the university. The court found that membership in a preferred 
religious denomination can be a bona fide occupational qualification falling 
within the meaning of Title VII.66 In a related case at another Catholic university, 
a rejected applicant for a theology position claimed the university’s actions 
constituted sex discrimination. Twenty-seven, full-time faculty positions in the 
theology department were held by Jesuits. The court ruled that its action fell 
within Title VII’s Section 702 exemption allowing religious schools/groups to 
hire employees of a particular religion, here Catholic. The trial court dismissed 
the case and the appellate court affirmed, based on the plaintiff’s failure to 
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.67 
In cases where Title VII’s exemptions for religious institutions are not ap-
plicable, employees may assert alternative theories of religious discrimination: 
disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. In general, higher education 
institutions are required to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion 
unless the employer can demonstrate an undue hardship.68 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has issued guidelines on the duty employers 
have under Title VII to provide reasonable accommodation for religious 
practices of their employees and applicants.69 A non-higher-education case 
offers guidance relative to the employer’s burden in cases involving religious 
accommodation. A public-school teacher requested to use the personal days 
provided in the union contract agreement allowing for paid leave for religious 
holiday observance. Additional days for religious observance would be af-
forded, but the employer would grant the additional days as unpaid leave. The 
schoolteacher sued the board of education, arguing religious accommodation 
should include additional days of paid leave. The United States Supreme Court 
held that an employer does not need to accede to the preferred accommoda-
64 Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F. 3d 196 (11th Cir 1997).
65 § 703(e)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
66 Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F. 2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
67 Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F. 2d 1213 (7th Cir 1987).
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
69 29 C.F.R. Part 1605.
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tions of the employee and may offer its own accommodations, as long as they 
meet a standard of reasonableness.70 
To prove a claim of religious discrimination under the disparate treatment 
theory, the evidentiary burdens of an employee alleging religious discrimination 
mirror those of an employee alleging race or national origin discrimination. 
In Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund,71 a plaintiff, 
who was Russian and Jewish, had been denied salary increases and promo-
tion to full professor. The associate professor established his prima facie case 
and presented evidence that a senior faculty member within the department 
referred to him as a “Russian Yankee” and made an antisemitic remark con-
cerning Jewish frugality. The institution justified the employment decisions 
on the basis that the professor’s teaching evaluations were low and his service 
record was inadequate. 
The appeals court affirmed summary judgment on the disparate treat-
ment claim for the institution, finding that the evidence of student evalua-
tions demonstrated that the associate professor was a poor teacher and was 
not entitled to the promotions he sought. The court reasoned that since salary 
increases were predicated upon merit and the available funds were limited, 
it was not improper for the institution to rely on these evaluations, together 
with memoranda and faculty reviews substantiating the professor’s ineffective 
mentoring of students and his low participation rate on faculty committees, 
as a basis for denying him salary increases. The appeals court’s judgment ul-
timately turned on the professor’s failure to substantiate that the institution’s 
articulated reasons for denying him promotion and salary increases were a 
pretext for discrimination. The appeals court agreed with the district court 
that the evidence of poor teaching performance was so overwhelming that 
the suggestion that some of the evaluations had been tampered with could 
not overcome the manifest weight of the evidence. As to the lack of service 
on committees, the appeals court recognized that discriminatory animus on 
the part of the department chair might have influenced the associate profes-
sor’s opportunities for committee assignments, but this was not regarded as 
sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the 
discriminatory comments by a faculty member who served on the promotion 
and pay raise committees would not defeat summary judgment on the claims 
of discrimination. In this case, the comments of the faculty member, alluding 
to the associate professor as a “Russian Yankee” and stating that “Jews are 
thrifty,” were stray remarks not shown to be proximate in time or otherwise 
related to the employment decisions at issue. 
However, there are instances in which an institution’s articulated reasons 
may permit an inference that the employment decision was motivated by a 
discriminatory intent. In a representative case, Abramson v. William Paterson 
College of New Jersey,72 the college hired the plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, as a 
70 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
71 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
72 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir 2001).
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tenure-track associate professor. At the beginning of her first year at the col-
lege, the professor informed her department chair that she would not be able to 
teach on Jewish holidays, and accommodations in her teaching schedule were 
permitted. However, a new department chair took exception to the arrangement, 
and this issue became a matter of contention between the administration and 
the professor as she progressed toward a tenure decision. Relations with the 
department chair and dean continued to strain over the issue of the professor’s 
religious absences, leading to a recommendation to discontinue the professor’s 
employment. After filing a grievance under the institution’s guidelines and 
initiating a complaint with the EEOC, the professor litigated under Title VII.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower federal court deci-
sion granting summary judgment to the institution. In addition to establishing 
a claim based on a hostile work environment, the professor succeeded in 
convincing the appeals court that she met the requirements for a prima facie 
case under disparate treatment and that the institution’s articulated reason for 
the adverse employment decision had shifted in the course of her dismissal. 
The appellate court stated that if a plaintiff demonstrates that the reasons given 
for termination do not remain consistent, beginning at the time they are prof-
fered and continuing throughout the administrative proceedings, this may be 
viewed as evidence tending to demonstrate pretext. Based on the record as 
a whole, the appellate court ruled that the professor successfully established 
that the college’s justification for tenure denial was sufficiently implausible 
and inconsistent enough that a fact-finder could reasonably disbelieve the 
articulated reasons.
Sex Discrimination
The shifting burden of proof in employment discrimination cases has 
application to claims of disparate treatment based on gender discrimination. 
A substantial number of these cases have involved allegations of gender 
discrimination in tenure denial. Institutions prevail in many of these cases on 
the basis that the proffered reasons for denying promotion and tenure were 
not pretextual. The college or university’s rationale for tenure denial typically 
involves a judgment of faculty and administrative leadership that courts are 
reluctant to overturn in the absence of compelling evidence of pretext.73 It is 
also unlikely that irregularities in the tenure review process will invalidate an 
adverse decision. While some irregularities, such as falsifying hiring criteria or 
documentary records, might lead to an inference of discrimination, subjective 
evaluative criteria, changes in the criteria over time, or lack of uniformity in 
procedures have been regarded as insufficient to establish pretext.74 However, 
while institutions enjoy substantial discretion and judicial deference in mak-
ing tenure and promotion decisions, institutional policies should be refined to 
73 See, for example, Lawrence v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 204 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 2000) in 
which subjective faculty assessments about the “quality of research” were largely unscrutinized 
by the reviewing court, despite a vigorous dissent by the chief judge of the appeals court.
74 Aquilino v. Univ. of Kansas, 83 F.Supp. 1248 (D.Kan. 2000).
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reduce the possibility of unequal treatment and to insure a documentary record 
that will provide evidence of consistency in the evaluation process. Standards 
of quality should not be so subjective that they cannot be effectively communi-
cated and consistently assessed at any stage of the faculty evaluation process.
Evidence of lack of uniformity in the treatment of similarly situated male 
and female candidates can be a significant factor in judging the likelihood of 
discriminatory intent under Title VII. Evidence substantiating discrimination 
based on gender in tenure and promotion decisions has included a showing 
that similarly situated male candidates received counseling to assist them in 
the tenure process and were advised of a requirement for a terminal degree 
when the female candidate was not so advised.75 In another instance, a court 
upheld the claim of an assistant professor and awarded tenure to her based 
on a finding that the university president’s sexist remarks about the English 
department had established gender bias.76 The university, in this latter case, had 
denied tenure despite unanimously favorable endorsement from department 
colleagues and support at administrative levels. 
In Leibowitz v. Cornell University, 77 a federal appeals court vacated sum-
mary judgment on a strong demonstration of pretext and held that the nonre-
newal of a teaching contract, even that of a nontenured individual, could form 
the basis for a Title VII claim. Leibowitz was a nontenured Senior Extension 
Associate, who had been teaching with the university since 1983. Although the 
program is based in Ithaca, she was teaching in Cornell’s extension facilities 
in New York City. While in a dispute regarding reimbursement of her travel 
expenses, the university did not renew her contract in 2002, citing “budgetary 
exigencies.”78 Although she was allowed to continue teaching in 2002-03, she 
retired in December 2002 to preserve her benefits. She filed suit under Title 
VII, the ADEA, and state and local law. 
Leibowitz presented evidence that supported her claim that Cornell’s stated 
budgetary concerns were merely a pretext for discrimination. Specifically, she 
asserted that the budgetary concerns stated in 2002 had diminished over that 
year and the school was in “solid financial shape” by 200379; the Extension 
Division had enough money to hire twelve new employees during the relevant 
time period; although the school laid off six employees, these employees were 
all women over age 50; although her requests for reimbursement of travel 
funds was cited as one reason for nonrenewal of her contract, negotiation for 
reimbursement of such funds was common practice among her male counter-
parts, and none of them were faced with nonrenewal or termination; she was 
not considered for positions that became vacant following her nonrenewal; 
a younger male was hired to fill a vacant teaching position in 2002; and she 
75 Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F. 2d 531 (2d Cir. 1980).
76 Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F. 2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989).
77 Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2009).
78 Id. at 494.
79 Id. at 504.
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was also not considered for an opening in 2003.80 Although the court makes 
reference to unequal treatment among male and female instructors, as well as 
among younger and older employees, the gender and age components were not 
specifically underscored as part of the decision. The Second Circuit reversed 
the district court’s award of summary judgment and rejected its holding that 
a teacher could only show adverse employment action by offering proof that 
she held a tenured position.81 
In general, an institution’s tenure and promotion process is extensive and 
multi-layered. It will require distinction in research or teaching, depending on 
institutional mission, and no evidence of significant deficiencies in any of the 
three relevant categories of research, teaching, and service. While plaintiffs 
in these cases may raise a number of issues, the burden to establish sufficient 
evidence that the institution’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination 
is difficult to carry. For example, in Bickerstaff v. Vassar College,82 a female 
African American associate professor challenged the institution’s decision to 
deny her promotion to full professor. Because the associate professor held 
positions in both the African studies and education departments, institutional 
policy required two separate advisory committees to make recommendations 
on promotion, with one committee voting for the candidate’s promotion and the 
other rejecting it. Based on internal and external appraisals of the candidate’s 
research and evidence from student evaluations, the institution denied her 
promotion. The candidate presented statistical evidence indicating differences 
in salary paid to faculty based on sex and race, as well as further statistical 
evidence tending to show that racial bias influenced student evaluations of 
her performance. Affirming summary judgment for the institution, the federal 
appeals court reasoned that the candidate failed to demonstrate “that the prof-
fered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that race 
was.”83 In the appeals court’s view, the associate professor’s burden was to 
persuade the trier of fact that she was the victim of intentional discrimination 
in that an illegal discriminatory reason played a motivating role in the deci-
sion not to promote. On this question, the court found that no genuine issue 
of material fact existed that would support the associate professor’s claim of 
intentional discrimination. 
The appeals court emphasized that while statistical reports may establish 
an inference of discrimination, the statistical evidence in this case was so 
incomplete that it was inadmissible, as well as irrelevant since it failed to 
account for all the applicable variables that might account for the perceived 
disparities in salary and evaluation outcomes. Although reliance on these 
student evaluations of instruction may involve subjective judgments and hair-
splitting when it comes to determining the point at which evaluations indicate 
“marked distinction,” the appeals court noted first that the institution possessed 
80 Id. at 505.
81 Id. at 510.
82 196 F.3d 435 (2d Cir. 1999).
83 Id. at 446.
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the expertise and the discretion to make such judgments, and second that the 
evidence in this case clearly reflected the candidate’s declining effectiveness 
in the classroom. 
The court reviewed evidence from a visiting faculty report that concluded 
there was opposition to the African studies program at the college and that the 
program was subject to hostility by some departments. However, when the full 
report was reviewed, the court noted that the visiting faculty had commented 
favorably on the program’s support from the college administration and from 
other departments on the campus. Moreover, the court emphasized that any 
perceived resistance to the African studies program could not have established 
discriminatory intent in the candidate’s promotion process. 
In cases involving disparities in compensation, statistical evidence may 
play a role in establishing a plaintiff’s prima facie case and meeting the burden 
to show the institution’s reason is a pretext to mask discrimination.84 When a 
female professor in a medical science field challenged the institution’s deci-
sion to pay a similarly situated male professor at a significantly higher level 
of compensation, she presented two statistical studies that indicated gender 
significantly affected faculty salaries at the university. After adjusting for fac-
tors such as rank, degree, tenure, duration at the institution, and age, women 
tended to earn lower salaries than men. The institution countered that the studies 
failed to distinguish faculty salaries among medical specialties.
When a jury subsequently returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the issues 
of sex discrimination under Title VII and unequal pay under the Equal Pay Act 
(EPA), a federal appeals court reasoned that statistics evidencing an employer’s 
pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct, though not determinative of 
an employer’s reason for the action, are still helpful to confirm a general pat-
tern of discrimination. Since the university failed to present evidence at trial 
rebutting the conclusions of the reports, the reports were sufficient to establish 
a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
The plaintiff, having met the initial burden of proof, then rebutted the uni-
versity’s affirmative defenses to explain the wage differential. The university 
first contended that the newly hired male professor was more productive in his 
ability to secure grants than the plaintiff, but the female professor established 
pretext by showing that the amount of grant funding she generated exceeded 
that of the new professor. As a second articulated reason for the disparity in 
compensation, the institution asserted the new male professor was offered a 
higher salary than that of the plaintiff as an incentive to retain the male profes-
sor’s wife based on market forces. However, the appeals court rejected this 
defense as well by noting that market forces were not a tenable argument in 
84 Cases involving claims of sex discrimination that involve disparities in compensation often 
involve both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. As one federal appeals court has noted, the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII must be “construed in harmony, particularly where claims made under 
the two statutes arise out of the same discriminatory pay policies.”  Lavin-McEleney v. Marist 
College, 239 F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
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this case, since they simply served to perpetuate the salary discrimination that 
Congress sought to alleviate in both Title VII and the EPA.85
While both Title VII and the EPA apply the same burden-shifting standard 
articulated in McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff is successful in demonstrat-
ing a prima facie case under the EPA, the employer may then respond with an 
affirmative defense to establish that the pay differential is due to a seniority 
system, a merit system, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of 
production, or any factor other than gender. For example, in Markel v. Board 
of Regents of University of Wisconsin,86 a plaintiff successfully demonstrated 
a pay disparity between herself and a similarly situated male consultant, thus 
establishing a prima facie case. The burden then shifted to the institution to 
provide evidence to justify the disparity in compensation, and the university 
explained that the male colleague’s pay was based on the longer number of 
years he had worked for the institution and the fact that he had held a higher 
position. This was a legitimate rationale, not based on gender, for the dispar-
ity in compensation, a finding that harmonized both the requirements of the 
EPA and Title VII.
Statistical models tend to show that disparities in compensation between 
a plaintiff and a class of institutional employees are not typically sufficient to 
establish a claim of disparate treatment unless the plaintiff can also produce an 
actual opposite-sex comparator for purposes of the Title VII or EPA claim.87 
However, once the plaintiff has identified an actual opposite-sex comparator, 
statistical models may be employed to show disparities, provided that the 
analysis incorporates relevant variables that could account for salary dispari-
ties on the basis of factors unrelated to gender bias.88 
In recent years, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,89 discussed 
earlier, has come into play in sex discrimination cases. For example, in Gen-
try v. Jackson State University,90 a federal district court upheld a professor’s 
discrimination claim in reliance on an expansively interpreted Ledbetter Act, 
finding that an otherwise untimely denial of tenure claim is permitted when 
intertwined with a successful demonstration of a discriminatory compensation 
decision, as a Title VII violation can occur each time a discriminatory paycheck 
is issued. In Gentry, a professor initially filed a discrimination claim with the 
EEOC in 2006 after being denied tenure in 2004. She alleged that tenure was 
denied due to her gender. She later filed suit in U.S. District Court, further al-
leging that the denial of tenure and resulting discriminatory pay violated Title 
VII, as well as claiming that the university retaliated against her for filing the 
EEOC claim. The university argued that her claim was untimely, as her EEOC 
claim was filed two years after the denial of tenure, and filed a motion for sum-
85 Siler-Khodr v. University of Texas Health Science, 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001).
86 See Markel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 276 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2002).
87 See Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., 10 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993).
88 Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College, 239 F.3d 476 (2nd Cir. 2001).
89 Ledbetter Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
90 610 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
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mary judgment. Gentry responded that in fact it was timely, as it qualified as a 
compensation decision under the Ledbetter Act. The district court agreed with 
the professor and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The university also filed motions for summary judgment on the profes-
sor’s claim of gender discrimination related to pay disparity, as it alleged she 
was unable to identify a male comparator, as well as for summary judgment 
on her retaliation claim. The district court also denied these motions based 
on factual disputes for later resolution at trial and because the claim grew out 
of the unequal pay claim, respectively. At subsequent trial, the professor was 
awarded $100,000 on the retaliation claim and, while the jury rejected her sex 
discrimination claim (for denial of tenure and disparate pay), it awarded her 
the total damages requested under all claims.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination
Sexual orientation discrimination law under Title VII is emerging. While 
sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII nationally, nor 
is there any federal law directed at such discrimination, there is a circuit split 
on interpretations of Title VII and sexual orientation-based claims. Many states 
and municipalities have passed state legislation or ordinances prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in both public and 
private sectors, and many have even added protections for gender identity and 
expressions. Issues related to sexual orientation go beyond discipline, hiring, 
discharge, and promotion; they also include access to benefits for unmarried 
same-sex partners and housing reserved for heterosexual couples. 
Sexual orientation discrimination claims can be brought to the EEOC, 
and many states have been responsive to these claims bringing them under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. For example, in Miguel v. Guess,91 the state appellate court denied the 
employer’s motion to dismiss a claim brought by the hospital employee alleging 
a Section 1983 claim that her dismissal was a result of her sexual orientation. 
Although the employee was allowed to move forward with her claim, she lost 
on public policy grounds because the state had not yet enacted law in this area. 
In Lovell v. Comsewogue School District,92 the federal district court found that 
the basis of sexual orientation discrimination was different than the other types 
and, if proven, would be an Equal Protection Clause violation and actionable 
under Section 1983. 
Plaintiffs have also been fruitful in their claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination using the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse standard on sex 
stereotyping. Under this standard, plaintiffs allege that they were harassed, 
discharged, or not hired because they did not fit the image of a “typical” man 
91 51 P.3d. 89 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
92 214 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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or woman. For example, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America,93 the plaintiff 
claimed that she was denied a position as a front desk clerk of a hotel because 
she looked like Ellen DeGeneres, who is a prominent gay celebrity, rather 
than a “Midwestern” girl. The appellate court reversed a summary judgment 
for the employer, ruling that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of sex 
discrimination to proceed to trial. 
Although there is no federal law prohibiting employment discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity or expression, commonly known as transgender 
status, many states and municipalities have adopted laws to recognize this kind 
of discrimination. The EEOC has ruled that discrimination based on gender 
identity/transgender status is a form of sex discrimination and violates Title 
VII.94 Although Title VII does not specifically provide protection for trans-
gendered individuals, some have had success challenging their discrimination 
under the Price Waterhouse theory of sex stereotyping.95 
For example, in Schroer v. Billington, the plaintiff applied for a position 
at the Library of Congress. The plaintiff presented as a male during the job 
interview and was later offered the job.96 However, when the plaintiff informed 
his prospective supervisor that he would be transitioning into the female 
gender, the offer was rescinded. The individual had an extensive career and 
was well qualified for the position, but the supervisor stated that she did not 
believe the plaintiff could be effective in the position as a transgender person. 
The court applied the Price Waterhouse standard and Title VII, and allowed 
the plaintiff to state a claim of sex discrimination and sexual stereotyping. 
The court ruled that the Library of Congress’ reasons for rescinding the offer 
were pretextual and facially discriminatory. The plaintiff was awarded over 
$500,000 in compensatory damages.97 
Transgender individuals can also state claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause.98 Also, claims of harassment of transgendered individuals can be made 
93 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010). See also Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 
(3d Cir. 2009) a federal appellate court reversed a summary judgment for employer in a claim 
brought by a male employee who claimed that he was harassed because he was perceived to 
be gay. 
94 See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012). See also Schroer v. 
Billington. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
95 See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d. 566 (6th Cir. 2004), where male firefighter was 
able to state a claim for being disciplined after he began sex reassignment.  See also Barnes v. 
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005), where federal appellate court affirmed jury verdict 
for police officer who alleged transgendered discrimination. 
96 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
97 See also Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, 542 F.Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
where the court denied summary judgment because “Title VII is violated when an employer 
discriminates against any employee, transsexual or not, because he or she has failed to act or 
appear sufficiently masculine or feminine enough for an employer.” 
98 See Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) where a biological male employee 
had begun the transition to the female gender and was dismissed.  Manager stated that it was 
“inappropriate” and the court determined that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of 
sex discrimination. 
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under Title VII on the basis of gender identity or expression and under state 
law.99 Although some states do not afford legal protections against discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation and identity/expression, many colleges and 
universities have included these populations as protected categories in their 
policies. Laws and policies in this area are ever-changing. In 2012, the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found that discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity, change of sex, or transgender status is a form of sex 
discrimination and a violation of Title VII.100 
As mentioned above, there is a circuit split whether or not sexual orienta-
tion-based claims can be brought under Title VII.101 While the Eleventh Circuit 
held that sexual orientation-based claims were not actionable under Title VII, 
the Second and Seventh Circuits held otherwise. In the Eleventh Circuit, the 
plaintiff claimed employment discrimination resulting from her sexual orien-
tation.102 The district court dismissed both claims, and the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed regarding the gender-conformity claim because 
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins103 discrimination based on an employee's 
failure to conform to a gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination. The 
appeals court, however, affirmed dismissal regarding the sexual orientation-
based claim. The Eleventh Circuit cited that "[d]ischarge for homosexuality 
is not prohibited by Title VII."104 
After Evans, the Seventh Circuit ruled a different conclusion in Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,105 where the plaintiff alleged 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Because of precedence, the trial 
court dismissed her claim and the original appellate panel affirmed. En banc, 
the court reversed and overruled prior precedent and offered two justifica-
tions why sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. First of 
all, using the “comparative method,” the plaintiff being a lesbian epitomizes 
the fundamental case of failure to conform to the female stereotype because 
she is attracted to other women, not men. Secondly, from the “associational 
theory,” the court contrasted the facts to cases of interracial couples, who 
are protected from race-based discrimination under Title VII. As a result, the 
99 See Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6521 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding 
that the Price Waterhouse standard precludes dismissal of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment and 
discrimination claims under Title VII). See also Del Piano v. Atlantic County, 2005 Dist. LEXIS 
20250 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that a cause of action exists under state law for a corrections 
worker who was allegedly harassed and discriminated against for cross-dressing on his own 
time).
100 See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 21, 2012).  
101 See generally J. Dalton Courson, Circuits Split on Interpretations of Title VII and Sexual-
Orietntation-Based Claims, aMer. bar aSSoC. (Mar. 19, 2018), available at https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civil-rights/practice/2018/circuits-split-on-
interpretations-of-title-vii-and-sexual-orientation-based-claims/.
102 See Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1238 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 
(2017).
103 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
104 See Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 587 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979)).
105 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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court found that discrimination against gays and lesbians implicates sex in the 
same manner that discrimination against a member of an interracial couple 
implicates race. Also, Title VII must be interpreted in light of Supreme Court 
cases recognizing that certain kinds of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation are unconstitutional.106 
More recently, the en banc Second Circuit issued Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc.107 Zarda agreed with Hively and overruled contrary precedent. The court 
found that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination 
because one cannot fully define a person’s sexual orientation without iden-
tifying his or her sex; as a result, sexual orientation is a function of sex. The 
court also found that sexual orientation is doubly delineated by sex because 
it is a function of both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom he or she 
is attracted. It is likely that other appeals courts may be called to address this 
issue, and the Supreme Court may be requested to resolve the split.
Retaliation
Punishing an employee for exercising the right to challenge an employment 
decision under Title VII is prohibited.108 However, lower federal courts have 
been divided on the degree of harm the employee must suffer before retali-
ation claims are actionable. As to retaliation claims, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Ray v. Henderson,109 explained that the 
federal circuits have developed different standards for assessing the severity 
of an adverse employment decision. As the Ninth Circuit characterized the 
issue, the circuits have aligned themselves with either a broad, restrictive, or 
intermediate position as to what constitutes an adverse employment decision 
actionable under Title VII.110 In addition, employees must establish the causal 
connection between any adverse employment decision and the exercise of 
rights under Title VII.111 Previously, the close temporal proximity between an 
employer’s knowledge of a protected activity (filing a Title VII claim) and 
an adverse employment action will be sufficient to establish causality. Also, a 
material employment action might have included situations for graduate student 
assistants involving “retaliatory conduct that does not relate to employment or 
which occurred outside the … graduate student assistant workplace” that “could 
well dissuade a reasonable … graduate student, TA, or research assistant from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”112 Further, it was held that 
anti-retaliation provisions also extended to those employees who may respond 
106 See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1990); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 
U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
107 No. 15-3775, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4608 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018) (en banc). 
108 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The retaliation provision makes it “an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate” against someone who has opposed an employer’s unlawful 
behavior or participated in a Title VII proceeding.
109 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
110 Id. at 1240-41.
111 Clark Cnty Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
112 Kovacevich v. Vanderbilt Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36054 (M.D. Tenn. April 12, 2010).
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to questions posed regarding discriminatory activity as part of an employer’s 
internal investigation,113 as well as third-parties claiming retaliation resulting 
from the actions of another.114 
More recently, the Court in University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center v. Nasser narrowed this causal connection standard and ruled that the 
higher but-for causation standard used in ADEA non-retaliation cases should 
also apply to Title VII retaliation cases.115 In this case, Dr. Naiel Nasser was a 
physician of Middle Eastern descent who was a specialist in infectious diseases 
and HIV/AIDS treatment. From 1995 to 1998 and 2001 to 2006, he served on 
the faculty of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center and was 
also a member of the medical staff of the hospital. He also served as Associate 
Medical Director of the hospital’s Amelia Court Clinic. After the hospital hired 
Dr. Beth Levine to direct the clinic and supervise Nasser, Dr. Nasser complained 
several times about Dr. Levine’s treatment of him, claiming that she treated 
him differently than the rest of the medical staff. Dr. Levine said, in Nasser’s 
presence, “Middle Easterners are lazy.” He met often with Dr. Gregory Fitz, 
the medical school’s Chair of Internal Medicine and Levine’s supervisor, to 
complain of her behavior. Levine encouraged Nasser to apply for promotion to 
associate professor, which he received, but he continued to claim harassment. 
Because of his continued discontentment, Nasser tried to become an employee 
of the hospital instead of just being on its medical staff. As a result, he would 
have to resign from the medical school faculty. When Nasser resigned, he cited 
Levine’s discrimination as a cause in his resignation letter to Fitz. In order to 
exonerate Levine, Fitz moved to block Nasser’s employment at the hospital.116 
Nasser claimed this block of employment at the hospital was retaliation for his 
claim of harassment by Levine; however, Fitz claimed that physician positions 
at the hospital were first priority for faculty members. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that when Congress added Section 2000e-
2(m) to Title VII in 1991, it did so only for the five status claims and not for 
retaliation claims. As a result, the Court found that under Title VII retaliation 
claims, they must be proved under traditional principles of but-for causation 
and not the lessened causation standard outlines in Section 2000e-2(m). This 
higher standard requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have 
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongdoing by the employer. This is 
key, since proving that retaliation is the but-for cause of an employment action 
is the most difficult form of causation to prove. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the retaliation for complaining is closely 
associated to the core prohibition of the status-based discrimination. 
In it, the retaliation provision of Title VII has been interpreted to focus 
on whether the employer’s conduct, even if it falls short of a termination or 
tangible act, would deter the reasonable person from engaging in protected 
113 Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
114 Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
115 135 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
116 Nasser v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d. 448 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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activity.117 Although the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII does not have the 
force of law, it is considered persuasive evidence of congressional intent. The 
manual explains that “[t]here is no requirement that the adverse action materi-
ally affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”118 
The question of how much harm the employee must have experienced 
as a result of an employer’s retaliatory action was addressed in Stavropoulos 
v. Firestone,119 in which the Eleventh Circuit, in considering a First Amend-
ment claim, emphasized that the retaliatory action “must involve an important 
condition of employment.”120 In that case, the plaintiff alleged she suffered 
emotional distress when University of Georgia officials sent her negative 
memos, including a mental illness memo, and encouraged faculty members 
with negative comments about the plaintiff to come forward. Relying on Title 
VII case precedent, the federal appeals court concluded that the alleged harm 
was too insubstantial because other agents of the university eventually over-
rode the decision. 
On the other hand, what constitutes an adverse employment action that 
rises to the level of retaliation under Title VII may include actions that fall short 
of termination. In Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science,121 the 
university argued, first, that a professor who alleged same-sex harassment did 
not demonstrate the existence of an adverse employment action. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, stating that 
in finding that the university had retaliated against the professor, the jury im-
plicitly found that an adverse employment action had been taken. A rational 
jury, according to the court, could have concluded both that no tangible em-
ployment action resulted from the sexual harassment and that the university 
subsequently retaliated against the professor for filing a complaint concerning 
the harassment. In this case, the professor did not lose any job benefits when he 
refused to comply with requests for sexual favors from his department chair, 
but he was subjected to unfavorable assignments, denied a paid leave, stripped 
of a stipend he regularly received, removed as the principal investigator on 
certain grants, and subjected to ridicule when he filed an internal complaint 
about the harassment. 
The university argued that many of the actions asserted by the professor did 
not rise to the level of “adverse employment actions.” The professor proffered 
eleven separate examples of events that he contended were causally linked to 
the filing of his complaints with the university. Although the court of appeals 
found that some of them did not qualify as “ultimate employment decisions,” 
it concluded that at least four of the actions allegedly taken by the university 
117 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, No. 915.003 Compliance Manual 8-II(D)(3) 
(1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/retal.pdf
118 Id. 8, at IV.
119 361 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2004).
120 Id. at 619.
121 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001).
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met this definition, giving particular attention to the denial of paid leave and 
the loss of a stipend he regularly received.122 
In Russell v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois,123 the plaintiff al-
leged that the university hospital in which she worked suspended her for five 
days in retaliation for her complaints about her supervisor and his treatment of 
female staff members. She brought the complaints against her supervisor after 
he initiated a disciplinary proceeding against her for inaccurately completing 
timecards. The plaintiff, in a disciplinary meeting, was subsequently found to 
have violated hospital policy and was suspended without pay for five days. 
She appealed the suspension, arguing that the decision to discipline her was 
tantamount to sexual harassment in retaliation for her complaints about her 
supervisor and his treatment of female staff members. 
The federal appeals court reasoned that in order to establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence 
that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, that she suffered an adverse 
employment action, and there exists a causal link between the protected 
expression and the adverse employment action. Although the appeals court 
found that a five-day suspension was a sufficiently adverse employment deci-
sion to invoke Title VII’s retaliation standards, the court found no evidence 
of a causal link between the punishment and the protected activity. The court 
affirmed a finding that there was no evidence the members of the institution’s 
disciplinary committee had any reason to believe that the supervisor triggered 
the disciplinary proceedings for reasons turning on retaliation, nor was there 
any record that they were aware of the plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, the appel-
late court ruled in favor of the university, concluding that it could not be liable 
under a theory of retaliation because the plaintiff failed to meet the third prong 
of a prima facie proof, presentation of evidence of a causal link between the 
employee’s actions and the adverse employment action.
In Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund,124 the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s determination that 
the evidence of retaliation for filing a discrimination claim was sufficient to 
overcome a summary judgment claim for the denial of a pay raise. The associate 
professor’s testimony that his dean had advised him that filing a discrimination 
claim was not a step a “good colleague” would take was corroborated in part 
by the testimony of the dean, who, although he attempted to distance himself 
from the meaning of the comment, admitted that he had urged the associate 
not to bring suit. In the view of the appeals court, this evidence was sufficient 
to allow a jury to conclude that the institution illegally retaliated against the 
associate professor. 
Similarly, in Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,125 a 
federal appeals court found that a professor’s complaints of religious discrimi-
122 Id. at 522-523.
123 243 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2001).
124 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
125 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir 2001).
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nation and harassment to the college, formal or informal, oral and written, 
were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case for retaliation. 
Further, the professor’s termination constituted an obvious adverse employ-
ment action. In light of the timing of her termination and the demonstration 
of ongoing administrative antagonism that established a causal nexus between 
the adverse employment action and the protected activity, the court of appeals 
concluded there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
draw inferences establishing a prima facie case for retaliation. In Crawford v. 
Nashville,126 the Supreme Court reversed district and circuit court decisions 
and held that the protection of the antiretaliation provision extends to an em-
ployee who simply reports discrimination as part of an employer’s internal 
investigation, even when that action is not taken on her own initiative and is, 
rather, the result of an investigation of complaints made by others. In this case, 
a school district was investigating rumors of sexual harassment by its employee 
relations director. As part of the investigation, the plaintiff was asked if she 
witnessed any inappropriate behavior.127 She provided details in the affirma-
tive. Shortly following the conclusion of the investigation, she and two other 
employees were terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for 
the school district, holding that the opposition clause of Title VII could not 
be satisfied because she had not initiated the complaint, and the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Noting that “nothing in the statute 
requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination 
on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the 
same words when her boss asks a question,”128 the Supreme Court ruled that 
an employee need not initiate a complaint or report of discrimination in order 
to receive protection under the opposition clause of Title VII. However, in 
Mato v. Baldauf,129 the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim based on an employee’s 
assertion that her termination in the course of a reorganization was based on 
her protected activity. The protected activity that the plaintiff alleged involved 
encouraging and assisting other women to file sexual harassment complaints. 
The court noted that approximately a year and a half passed between the last 
sexual harassment complaint and the plaintiff’s termination, a time period that 
did not support an inference of retaliation. Moreover, she failed to present any 
evidence that the director who initiated the reorganization even knew that she 
had aided female coworkers in filing sexual harassment claims, all five inci-
dents of which took place before the director began working for institution. 
The plaintiff contended that the institution’s decision to require a Ph.D. for the 
curator’s position, and the consequential termination of her employment in the 
reorganization, was the act of retaliation. However, the appellate court found 
that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that would allow a jury to 
conclude that the reorganization decision was a pretext to retaliate against her. 
126 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 278.
129 267 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2001).
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The court stated that the first step was to determine whether the director acted 
independently in deciding that the new curator would be required to hold the 
Ph.D. degree, or whether he was prevailed upon by others in the organization 
who were motivated by a retaliatory animus to create this requirement as a 
pretext for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. The court ruled that the 
plaintiff produced no evidence which would allow a jury to conclude that a 
retaliatory animus was the impetus for this action.
The Supreme Court once again expanded the scope of retaliation claims 
in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,130 with its unanimous decision 
to afford protection to those employees who have not engaged in protected 
activity themselves but who claim to have been retaliated against for the pro-
tected activity of another. In it, a female employee filed a sex discrimination 
complaint against her employer with the EEOC. Her fiancé, Thompson, who 
also worked for the same employer, was subsequently terminated; he claimed 
that his termination was in violation of Title VII, as it was in retaliation for her 
filed charges. As stated by the Court, such third-party retaliation claims are 
limited to those who fall “within the zone of interests sought to be protected 
by Title VII.”131 
Although it is difficult to establish specific guidelines for which relation-
ships would be protected in a third-party situation, it is reasonable to infer that 
termination of a close relative of an employee engaging in a protected activity 
will almost always rise to the level of unlawful retaliation under Title VII. In 
its reasoning, the Court relied on its prior holding in Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,132 in that “Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct”133 and that “the 
anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to 
discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment,”134 
but rather prohibits action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”135 In the immediate 
case, Thompson’s termination rose to the level of unlawful retaliation, as a 
reasonable employee might well have been dissuaded from engaging in the 
protected activity of filing the discrimination charge if she were aware that her 
fiancé would risk termination. Ultimately, the Court reiterated its Burlington 
reasoning that “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend 
upon the particular circumstances.”136 
130 562 U.S. 1041 (2011).
131 Id.
132 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 64.
135 Id. at 68.
136 Id. at 69.  Although the Thompson decision creates some uncertainty, as the Court declines to 
provide a precise list of relationships that fall within the “zone of interests,” an employer’s best 
course of action to minimize potential impact remains consistent application of well-vetted 
policies and procedures, and detailed documentation related to adverse employment decisions. 
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Reverse Discrimination/Affirmative Action
The passage of Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would 
suggest that it was primarily intended to protect minorities and women from 
discrimination in the workplace. However, the provisions of the law have also 
been characterized as applying to all races, religious groups, and people of 
both genders. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court addressed a case of 
reverse discrimination in which it concluded that Title VII “was intended to 
cover white men and women and all Americans."137 The Court applied Title 
VII to a case in which two white workers had been fired by their employer for 
stealing, but a third employee caught stealing, who was black, was not fired. 
When the two white workers brought suit, the Court stated that Title VII’s 
"terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular 
race."138 This concept is supported in the 2009 Supreme Court decision in 
Ricci v. DeStefano,139 discussed in detail later in this chapter.
However, the Court also addressed an affirmative action plan based on a 
collective bargaining agreement between the United Steelworkers of America 
and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation that seemed to undercut 
the “colorblind” reading of Title VII. In United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber,140 the Court examined a bargaining agreement that called for company 
training programs in an effort to promote more black workers, and earmarked 
a percentage of available slots in the training programs for these employees. 
The plaintiff in this case was a white worker who was denied a place in the 
training program, despite the fact that he was a more senior employee than 
any of the black employees selected. In deciding Weber, a majority of the 
Supreme Court rejected the view that the private company’s affirmative ac-
tion program negotiated with a union violated Title VII’s prohibitions against 
racial discrimination in employment. The majority reasoned that Congress 
did not intend to condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative 
action plans, and the affirmative action plan under consideration, which was 
designed to eliminate traditional patterns of conspicuous racial segregation, 
was permissible under Title VII. The Court’s decision was influenced in part by 
the fact that the affirmative action plan did not require the discharge of white 
workers, its replacement with new black hirees did not create an absolute bar 
to the advancement of white employees, and the plan was a temporary measure 
not intended to maintain racial balance but simply to eliminate a manifest 
racial imbalance.141
As these differing opinions would suggest, the application of Title VII has 
not been easily adapted to claims of reverse discrimination. Claims in which 
a white male seeks redress under Title VII have resulted in agreement that 
137 McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
138 Id. at 276.
139 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
140 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
141 Id. at 205-206.  
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the reverse discrimination plaintiff may establish a claim under the “direct 
evidence” standard. Lower courts, however, have not uniformly adopted a 
similar approach in instances where the reverse discrimination plaintiff has 
asserted disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence. Direct evi-
dence of discrimination could be shown by the employer’s admissions of a 
discriminatory intent, but the likelihood of such an admission against interest 
seems remote in the more sophisticated academic setting in which subjective 
hiring and promotion decisions would veil direct evidence of discrimination. 
When whites or men are the “minorities” in the institution in which they 
work, the shifting burden of proof in disparate treatment tends to work in the 
same way as it would in a traditional McDonnell Douglas context. In these 
cases, a majority plaintiff may show "intentionally disparate treatment when 
background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that 
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."142 In an illustra-
tive case, a white female professor of home economics at a historically black 
college established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title 
VII. The faculty member, who was in a racial minority at an institution where 
blacks outnumbered whites approximately two-to-one, both on the faculty and 
in the student body, claimed constructive discharge in that her decision not 
to continue at the institution was predicated on the hostility of her superiors. 
Although the institution insisted that nonrenewal would have been justified 
based upon charges of incompetence and lack of rapport with students, the 
faculty member presented compelling evidence that her superior had rejected 
claims of academic deficiencies and that department faculty had engaged in 
a systematic campaign to remove her from the department. This evidence 
included instigating student unrest and coercing students to sign a petition op-
posing the white professor’s continued employment. When these findings were 
combined with evidence of the hiring of an African American faculty member 
to replace the white professor, the federal appeals court affirmed a lower court 
decision that because of her race, the white professor’s failings were treated 
more harshly than similar failings in a black teacher would have been, and that 
her contract would have been renewed but for the fact that she was white.143 
When background circumstances confirm that a white employee is suing 
a predominately white higher education institution under Title VII, different 
proof would appear to be required. Clearly, the plaintiff is unlikely to establish 
that the institution typically discriminates against the majority. Initially, the 
reverse discrimination plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, including 
a showing that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class under Title VII. 
Even if this hurdle is overcome, the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden of 
proof has emphasized that an institution of higher education need only meet 
a burden of production, insofar as the employer must articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. The plaintiff-employee, 
however, must meet a burden of persuasion in which the ultimate burden is to 
142 Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
143 Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1983).
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persuade the court that the challenged decision was the result of discrimina-
tory motivation. 
In some cases, the minority or female plaintiff’s proof that the articulated 
reason put into evidence by the institution was not the true reason is sufficient 
for the fact-finder to draw the inference that the true reason involved a discrimi-
natory purpose. This inference is plausible because the institution’s failure to 
put into evidence a credible nondiscriminatory reason may suggest that the 
real reason is discrimination, given the history of societal prejudice against 
minorities and women. However, when a white male plaintiff challenges an 
employment decision against a predominantly white higher education institu-
tion, it is more difficult to draw the inference that the employer acted because 
of discrimination against white males, even where a legitimate reason for the 
adverse employment decision has been negated. For example, a male assistant 
professor sued when he was denied tenure for failure to publish sufficiently, 
alleging that women were held to a lesser standard. The jury agreed and found 
a violation of Title VII, and the predominately white university appealed. On 
the issue of direct discrimination, the appellate court held that statements by 
the interim dean, that females and males were judged on different standards, 
was not probative evidence that the tenure decision was motivated by gender. 
In addition, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish either that 
he was qualified for tenure or that he was denied tenure in circumstances 
permitting an inference of discrimination. Because the evidence, in the view 
of the appeals court, did not support the jury’s findings, the case was reversed 
and remanded.144
Many reverse discrimination cases arise in the context of institutionally 
adopted affirmative action plans designed to increase the representation of 
minorities and women in the workforce, or to correct alleged inequities in pay 
and promotion. When these plans are challenged under Title VII, the majority 
plaintiff can meet the prima facie burden to show unequal treatment, since the 
institution’s plan consciously uses race or gender to advance the employment 
opportunities of minorities and women. However, if the institution’s plan is 
valid, the institution can advance a legitimate reason for the use of race or 
sex in employment decisions. This rationale requires a reverse discrimination 
plaintiff to show that the institution’s plan discriminates against the plaintiff 
and that the plan itself is invalid. In many of these cases, the plaintiff will 
challenge the plan on both equal protection and Title VII grounds. The United 
States Supreme Court has applied a standard of strict scrutiny to recent cases 
144 Krystek v. Univ. of S. Mississippi, 164 F. 3d 251 (5th Cir 1999).
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in which a public employer has adopted an affirmative action plan favoring 
minorities.145 
Reverse discrimination cases in higher education suggest that federal 
courts may be predisposed to recognize instances of reverse discrimination in 
affirmative action plans. In 1980 and 1989, as part of a settlement for gender-
based discrimination claims, the University of Minnesota entered into consent 
decrees. The 1989 decree required female faculty members to take part in the 
distribution of $3 million. A male professor argued that the provisions of the 
consent decree discriminated against him because of his sex and sought dam-
ages by filing a Title VII and equal protection claim. The case was complicated, 
because the plan in question was implemented pursuant to a consent decree and 
was not a voluntary affirmative action plan. However, it was established that the 
plan mandated by the consent decree was not imposed after a judicial finding 
of intentional discrimination on the part of the university. After considering 
three statistical models measuring the differences in salaries between females 
and males, the district court granted summary judgment to the university on 
the male professor’s claims. However, the appellate court reversed the sum-
mary judgment. The male professor met his burden to demonstrate that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the variety of 
statistical models established a manifest or conspicuous imbalance in faculty 
salaries based on gender. Although this ruling left unanswered the question of 
whether the salary plan unreasonably discriminated against the male faculty 
member, the ruling established that the white professor was entitled to pursue 
his Title VII discrimination claim.146
In Hill v. Ross,147 a college dean raised objections to the appointment of 
a male candidate for a faculty position, insisting that the department fill the 
position with a female. The dean had imposed hiring goals on the department 
that included increasing the number of women and minority faculty. He stipu-
lated in e-mail communications that he was unwilling to send male candidates 
forward, and he ultimately refused to forward the name of the male candidate 
selected by the faculty. The university defended its decision to leave the posi-
tion vacant, rather than hire the professor, on the basis that the dean’s decision 
was made pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, noting three factors in the record that suggested a possible 
violation of Title VII. First, the appeals court was persuaded that a jury might 
reasonably conclude that the dean of the college used sex as the sole criterion 
for his decision not to recommend hiring the male applicant. Reasoning that 
145 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) in which the Court held that all racial 
classifications developed as part of an affirmative action plan by any government —state, 
local or federal—are to be strictly scrutinized, and Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 
(1989), in which the Court applied strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause to a city's affirmative action program requiring a 30% set-aside for minority 
subcontractors. 
146 Maitland v. Univ. of Minnesota, 155 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 1998).
147 183 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1999).
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the dean’s imposition of hiring goals involving minorities and women might 
have exceeded the permissible application of an affirmative action plan, the 
court noted that the university did not contend its affirmative action plan, which 
was essential to the eradication of the consequences of past discrimination, 
either in the academic department or elsewhere in the institution. Second, the 
existing affirmative action plan at the institution did not require that the dean 
insist upon the hiring of a female candidate. Finally, the court emphasized that 
the plaintiff carried the burden to show that reliance on the affirmative action 
plan might be pretextual. By presenting evidence that the express terms of the 
affirmative action plan did not support the dean’s decision to block the appoint-
ment, coupled with the university’s admission that it had not engaged in past 
discrimination, the plaintiff effectively shifted the burden to the institution to 
come forth with a justification for the use of sex in the hiring decision. Since 
neither the university’s plan nor its brief addressed that justification, it was 
compelled to offer an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” The plaintiff then 
could have borne the burden of overcoming it. 
In deciding Ricci v. DeStefano,148 the Supreme Court set a new rule of 
law on when an employer can intentionally discriminate to avoid a lawsuit. 
In Ricci, a test was given by the city to determine which firefighters would 
advance to vacant lieutenant and captain positions. Upon receipt of the results, 
it was discovered that the white candidates had outperformed the minority 
candidates, and the city discarded the results to avoid a potential lawsuit due 
to the disparate impact of the test on minority candidates. As a result, the white 
and Hispanic firefighters who passed the test sued in federal court, alleging 
racial discrimination. The trial court ruled for the city, reasoning that if the 
city had gone through with certifying the test results, it may have been liable 
under Title VII for adopting a practice resulting in disparate impact on the 
minority firefighters, and the appeals court affirmed. However, a five-person 
majority of the Supreme Court reversed, remanded, and ultimately held that 
the city had improperly discarded employment test results on which minority 
candidates had underperformed disproportionately.
As Title VII not only prohibits intentional acts of discrimination but also 
policies and practices not intended to be discriminatory that nevertheless 
disproportionately impact a protected group, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the City found itself in an untenable situation. It essentially was faced 
with a choice to impose disparate impact on the minority firefighters, or ef-
fect disparate treatment on the firefighters who would have been eligible for 
promotion given the results of the test. The Court, therefore, was presented 
with considering whether intentional action to avoid disparate impact liability 
for one group under Title VII outweighs the possibility of that action resulting 
in disparate treatment discrimination for another.
The Court determined that the disparate treatment would only be justified 
if there were a “strong basis in evidence” that test certification would have 
148 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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created liability for disparate impact. Because the court reasoned that the City 
undertook significant care in developing the test, and thus could have shown it 
to be “job related” and consistent with “business necessity,” it held that there 
was not enough evidence to support the theory that the city would have faced 
liability if it had certified the test results.149 Further, the Court argued that an 
equally valid, less discriminatory alternative could not have been identified 
by the minority candidates. In ordering the city to reinstate the test results, 
the Court warned that “fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s 
reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations 
and qualified for promotions.”150 
Filing a Complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
An individual who has experienced discrimination based on the various 
protected classes mentioned above may file a complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which enforces Title VII. The 
EEOC may receive, investigate, and resolve complaints of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination, and it may also initiate lawsuits against violators or issue 
right-to-sue letters to complainants. Employees have two possible causes of 
action, disparate impact or disparate treatment. Disparate treatment is more 
common in postsecondary education. This manifests when an individual is 
denied a job, promotion, or tenure or claims to be treated less favorably than 
their colleagues because of their race, sex, national origin, or religion, and is 
subjected to a detrimental working condition. All employment discrimination 
laws that are enforced by the EEOC, except for the Equal Pay Act, require 
complaints to be filed with the EEOC before civil lawsuits may be commenced 
against the alleged discriminator. It is critical to note that a complainant has to 
file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the incident. 
While complaints can be filed with the EEOC, Carbado and Gulati argued 
there are three problems with antidiscrimination law in proving discrimination 
in the workplace.151 First, courts do not give credence to applicants who are 
members of marginalized populations and how their positionality subjects them 
to stereotypes and misconceptions regardless of the applicant’s credentials. 
Because evidence, direct or circumstantial, is expected to support claims of 
discrimination, it is challenging to establish fault with an individual or the 
organization, especially because institutions will rely on their nondiscrimina-
tory policies. 
Secondly, when producing evidence to support the claim, institutions of 
higher education have established policies and programs that portray a persona 
of being inclusive and nondiscriminating environments. Since an applicant will 
149 Id. at 559.
150 Id. at 592.
151 See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17. 
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only have limited interactions with the institution during the interview process, 
it may be difficult to show how a person was not hired unless someone says 
or does something that is deemed discriminatory. 
The third and final question that must be answered for all discriminatory 
claims is: “Was there intentional discrimination based on the plaintiff’s mem-
bership in a protected class, such as race, gender, or disability?” So long as 
an employer can show nondiscriminatory reasons, this is difficult to prove. If 
there is evidence that hiring officials said or did something discriminatory, “fit” 
will be couched in nondiscriminatory language despite the candidate knowing 
what they experienced. Plaintiffs in most cases have to rely on circumstantial 
evidence of intentional discrimination, and evidence would need to illustrate 
the alleged discrimination similarly to the assertion made by the applicant.
Re-examining Plaintiff’s Burden
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,152 a unanimous United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the 1991 amendments to Title VII allow a plaintiff to 
advance a mixed- motive discrimination claim against an employer. The essence 
of a mixed-motive claim is that the plaintiff alleges the employer’s adverse 
employment action is predicated on both legitimate and illegitimate motives. 
The decision contradicts the generally accepted presumption associated with 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins153 that precludes a finding of mixed-motive dis-
crimination if the employer could prove it would have made the same employ-
ment decision with regard to the employee in the absence of discrimination. 
The essence of the Costa decision is that a plaintiff could prevail on a Title 
VII claim by showing, through a preponderance of direct or circumstantial 
evidence, that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the chal-
lenged employment decision.
In Costa, the Supreme Court held that the changes in Title VII make no 
mention of a heightened direct-evidence requirement for a plaintiff.154 The 
Court read the statute to require that a plaintiff “demonstrate that an employer 
used a forbidden consideration with respect to any employment practice.”155 
The Court noted, “[I]n order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a 
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to con-
clude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”156 The 
requirement for “sufficient evidence” does not contemplate the necessity for 
“direct evidence” and would permit a plaintiff in a Title VII action to prove 
discrimination on the basis of circumstantial evidence. By allowing plaintiffs 
to proceed with a Title VII mixed-motive discrimination claim solely on the 
152 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
153 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
154 Id. at 2153.
155 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2002)).
156 Id. at 2154-55.
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basis of circumstantial evidence, the Court’s decision in Costa may make it 
easier for plaintiffs to succeed against employers in some cases.
While this decision appears to compromise Price Waterhouse, Costa 
does not modify the shifting burden of proof in McDonnell Douglas. The 
decision does not change the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuading the 
fact-finder that he or she was a victim of intentional discrimination. However, 
the plaintiff may now succeed in this proof either directly, by persuading the 
fact-finder that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or 
indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy 
of credence.157 Whether Costa will be interpreted by lower courts to reduce 
the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion in Title VII cases has yet to be 
determined, but lower federal courts will be tasked to make that determination 
on a case-by-case basis.
In one such decision, Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,158 the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied a new analysis that leaves the initial stages of McDon-
nell Douglas intact. In this modified or merged proof structure, the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case, and the defendant must articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The Fifth 
Circuit then proposed that a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to create 
a genuine issue of material fact either that the defendant's articulated reason 
was a pretext for discrimination (a pretext alternative), or that the defendant's 
reason is true but another motivating factor for the decision was discrimination 
based on a protected characteristic (a mixed-motives alternative).159 
Conclusion
Title VII remains the principal vehicle for pursuing claims of employment 
discrimination involving race, religion, national origin, and gender. Particularly 
in cases involving disparate treatment, the shifting burden of proof applicable 
to Title VII claims has been adopted as the appropriate standard when pursuing 
claims under the provisions of other federal and state antidiscrimination laws. 
However, federal and state courts will continue to refine the shifting burden in 
response to case-by-case analyses and legislative modifications of Title VII. 
Two emergent issues will occupy federal courts in the immediate future. 
First, judges will be compelled to determine the extent to which claims of 
reverse discrimination will be actionable when brought against predominantly 
white institutions. It should be anticipated that challenges to affirmative action 
hiring and promotion plans will be among the challenges brought by white 
males under the auspices of both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause. In a larger sense, courts must ultimately assess 
whether differing standards in reverse discrimination suits are constitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the shifting burden of proof as 
157 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
158 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
159 Id. at 312.
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established in McDonnell Douglas seems destined for revision in light of new 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting legislative changes to federal antidis-
crimination law.
Discussion Questions
1. Title VII covers what kinds of employment discrimination?
2. What kinds of discrimination claims may employees assert against their 
employer? 
3. How may employees assert claims against their employer for sexual 
orientation discrimination? How about gender identity or transgendered 
status discrimination? Do the laws apply the same everywhere nationally? 
4. What are some of the arguments raised in cases alleging reverse dis-
crimination? 
5. Besides Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, list five other federal 
statutes that aim to curtail employment discrimination. 
